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Abstract: This paper develops and tests three hypotheses about the effects of European 
integration on voting behavior in the 2001 British General Election.  First, preferences over 
joining the common currency (Euro) influence voting behavior, as predicted by the EU issue 
voting hypothesis.  Second, economic voting is weaker among those who believe the national 
economy to be influenced more by the EU than by the national government.  Third, voter 
abstention is higher among those who believe that the economy is influenced more by the EU 
than by the national government.  Analyses of data from the 2001 British Election Study find 
support for the first and third hypotheses, suggesting multiple ways in which European 
integration influences national elections and highlighting several avenues for further research. 
 
 
    2
Students of comparative politics have given greater attention in recent years to the effects 
of international economic integration on domestic electoral politics.  Noting the consequences of 
these policies for citizens and domestic interest groups and the difficulties that integrations poses 
for domestic governance, researchers have developed several hypotheses.  One group of studies, 
focusing primarily on the European Union (EU), has marshaled evidence in support for the EU 
issue voting hypothesis, which posits that preferences over European integration shape voting 
behavior in domestic elections (Gabel 2000, Tillman 2004, de Vries 2007, Schoen 2008).  One 
finding from this literature is that global market integration undermines the perceived 
competence of national leaders to make economic policy, thus weakening economic voting 
(Hellwig 2001, Samuels and Hellwig 2007).  More recently, studies have examined the 
consequences of globalization for other aspects of domestic electoral behavior, with findings 
suggesting that globalization reduces voter turnout (Tillman 2008).  Taken together, these studies 
suggest that the transfer of sovereignty from national governments to supranational organizations 
or to international market forces have several important consequences for domestic electoral 
politics. 
  Although these recent studies have made impressive strides, they have operated largely as 
independent research agendas.  As a result, there has been little consideration of how one set of 
findings might relate to the others.  Also, it is unclear whether we should expect European 
integration to have similar effects as globalization upon voting behavior.  For example, the 
evidence collected to this point does not allow us to evaluate whether European integration has 
reduced the magnitude of economic voting in the same fashion as globalization.  This paper 
seeks to build upon and unify these separate research agendas by simultaneously testing each 
claim on data drawn from an EU member state.   3
  This study presents and tests three hypotheses drawn from these research traditions.  In 
addition to examining these hypotheses in different empirical settings, this approach also has the 
advantage of allowing one to examine whether these effects operate simultaneously.  The 
hypotheses are tested using data from the 2001 British Election Study.  The evidence is 
consistent with the three hypotheses.  The results indicate that preferences over British adoption 
of the common currency (the Euro) have a clear effect on voting behavior, as respondents are 
more likely to vote for parties closer to their own position on the Euro.  This finding extends the 
EU issue voting hypothesis (Gabel 2000, Tillman 2004, de Vries 2007) to examine the effects of 
an issue related to European integration (see also Schoen 2008).  Second, respondents who 
believe that the EU has the greater effect upon economic conditions in the UK are less likely to 
vote than those who do not, consistent with other arguments about the depressing effects of 
globalization on voter turnout (Tillman 2008).  However, this paper does not find evidence that 
economic voting is weaker among those who ascribe more economic responsibility to the EU 
than to the British government (Hellwig 2001, Hellwig and Samuels 2007).   
  The following sections of this paper elaborate on these arguments and findings.  The next 
section develops the three hypotheses by drawing upon the relevant literatures.  The following 
sections describe the research design and present the results of the analyses, and the final section 
discusses the findings and suggests directions for future research. 
 
European Integration and Domestic Electoral Behavior 
  The arguments in this paper draw upon research examining the effects of European 
integration on mass behavior within the EU specifically, and the consequences of globalization 
on mass politics generally.  However, the focus is solely on the consequences of European   4
integration.  Of course, there are a variety of ways in which globalization and European 
integration are very different processes.  For the purposes of this study, I expand hypotheses 
developed in the study of the consequences of globalization on mass politics to study of the EU.  
Doing so increases our understanding of the consequences of economic and political integration 
on domestic electoral politics.  In addition, I expand a hypothesis about the effects of EU 
membership on voting behavior to consider a more specific EU policy. 
This paper focuses on two ways in which European integration influences mass behavior.  
First, it generates political conflict over potential EU policies that become the basis of issue 
voting in domestic elections.  To use the issue studied in this paper, British political elites and 
citizens differ on when, if ever, the United Kingdom should adopt the Euro as its currency.  In 
the 2001 general election, the Conservative Party aggressively campaigned on a pledge to “save” 
the Pound (Bartle 2003, 167), while Labour and the Liberal Democrats adopted more favorable 
positions.  This differentiation gave citizens the ability to vote for the party closest to their 
preferences on this issue.  Second, European integration results in the transfer of authority from 
the national to the supranational (EU) level.  This transfer of authority reduces the real and 
perceived competence of national governments in economic policy, with monetary policy being 
constrained by participation in the common currency.  Below, I develop three hypotheses 
relating these two consequences of European integration to domestic electoral politics.  
EU Issue Voting 
  Since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, scholarly interest in the sources of citizen 
attitudes towards the EU and their consequences for European politics has grown. Several key 
findings have emerged.  First, citizen attitudes towards the EU are rooted in utilitarian (Gabel 
1998), domestic political (Anderson 1998), and socio-cultural (Carey 2002, McLaren 2002)   5
concerns.  Second, there is some level of responsiveness between citizen attitudes and party 
positions on EU issues (Carrubba 2001, Steenbergen et al 2007), though there also appears to be 
a gap between elite and mass opinion on the EU, with elites being more supportive (Hooghe 
2003, Mattila and Raunio 2006).  Finally, the institutional weakness of the European Parliament 
engenders low participation in European elections (Mattila 2003), suggesting that national 
politics may prove a more viable outlet for contesting European issues.  This set of 
circumstances led van der Eijk and Franklin (2004) to describe the EU issue as a “sleeping giant” 
in electoral politics.  As a result, scholars have begun to examine whether the EU has evolved in 
an electoral issue in national politics. 
  The EU issue voting hypothesis states that citizen preferences over European integration 
influence their vote choice in national elections.  Specifically, citizens are expected to vote for 
the party that adopts a position closest to their own on the EU question.  Previous studies have 
found evidence consistent with this hypothesis (Gabel 2000, Tillman 2004, de Vries 2007, de 
Vries and Tillman 2008).  These studies have largely established the point that (at least in recent 
years) evidence of EU issue voting can be found across West and East Europe in different 
political contexts. 
  This paper expands our understanding of the EU issue voting hypothesis by moving 
beyond the question of general support of or opposition to the EU.  The previous studies cited 
above have measured the distance between a party and citizen in terms of placement on a scale in 
which one pole indicates opposition to European integration (or EU membership) and the other 
indicates support.
1 However, EU membership itself is often not the point of contention among 
                                                 
1 The exact measures have varied across studies, although each has followed the same basic 
logic.  For example, Tillman (2004) measures the respondent’s and party’s perceived support or   6
parties.  Instead, specific issues related to European integration (such as an expansion of EU 
powers) may become salient in campaigns.  For example, Schoen (2008) demonstrates that 
attitudes about Turkey’s bid for EU membership influenced voting behavior in the 2005 German 
federal elections.   
This study examines the electoral effects of support for adopting the Euro in the 2001 
British general election.  There are several reasons why the EU issue voting hypothesis would 
apply to questions about the Euro.  First, adoption of the common currency requires a major 
transfer of sovereignty from the national to the supranational level.  States that adopt the Euro 
lose control over monetary policy and face additional constraints over fiscal policies as well.  
The policy importance (as well as the symbolic meaning) of this issue means that it likely to be 
salient to voters and parties.  Second, there was considerable disagreement over the Euro in 
Britain at the time of the 2001 election.  The major British parties took divergent and public 
positions on the Euro, which are reflected in the 2001 British Election Study survey data.  The 
mean respondent in the 2001 British Election Study identified the Liberal Democrats as being 
most in favor of joining the Euro, Labour holding a slightly weaker position in favor, and the 
Conservatives being opposed.  Importantly, respondents were equally divided on the Euro.  
Thus, there is mass- and party-level disagreement over the issue.  This leads to the first 
                                                                                                                                                             
opposition to that country’s EU membership.  De Vries (2007) uses a similar measure, in which 
one pole indicates exit from the EU and the other indicates the fastest build-up of the EU.  De 
Vries and Tillman (Nd) use a scale in which one pole indicates that integration has “already gone 
too far” and the other indicates that integration “should be pushed further.” Though the wording 
differs, the logic of each involves support for EU membership or continued European integration 
in a general sense.    7
hypothesis that attitudes over joining the Euro affect voting behavior in the 2001 British election.  
Individuals should be more likely to vote for the party closest to them on the issue.  Phrased 
differently, increasing distance between the respondent and party on the Euro should reduce the 
likelihood of the respondent supporting that party.  
Hypothesis One: Individuals are more likely to vote for a party that is closer to them on 
the question of adopting the common currency. 
Economic Integration and Economic Voting 
  Scholars more recently have begun to consider the effects of economic integration on 
electoral politics.  Of particular concern is the degree to which economic integration constraints 
the (real or perceived) ability of national governments to pursue independent economic policies.  
Given its emphasis on regional economic integration, it stands to reason that European 
integration will produce similar effects on domestic electoral politics.  Compliance with EU law 
on internal markets eliminates a variety of policy options for national governments, and 
participation in the common currency further limits member states’ monetary and fiscal policies.  
If governments are forced to abandon certain economic policies in order to comply with EU law 
(and, possibly, to remain competitive within the common market), democratic representation 
may be curtailed insofar as publics may demand certain policies that leaders are constrained from 
adopting. 
  A series of recent studies argue that economic voting under globalization has been 
weakened (Hellwig 2001, Hellwig and Samuels 2007).  As globalization increases, citizens may 
believe that their national governments are constrained in their ability to manage the economy in   8
the face of market forces.
2 Believing that maintaining competitiveness in an open market 
prevents state leaders from adopting certain policies and that market forces may overwhelm 
others, rational citizens decline to hold the government accountable for economic outcomes that 
it was (apparently) powerless to control.  The result is that citizens do not engage in economic 
voting.  This argument found support at the individual level (Hellwig 2001) and at the aggregate 
level (Hellwig and Samuels 2007). 
  Similar effects upon economic voting should exist within the EU.  Given the degree to 
which the common market has developed, member states face numerous constraints on their 
policymaking ability.  The regulatory power of the European Commission may reinforce these 
constraints in the eyes of voters.  Finally, the strategic behavior of politicians in blaming 
unpopular decisions on external constraints is prevalent within the EU, which may further 
increase these perceived constraints (Hellwig and Samuels 2007, 288).  Following the arguments 
of Hellwig (2001) and Hellwig and Samuels (2007), the second hypothesis predicts that evidence 
of economic voting should be weaker among those who believe that the EU has more influence 
on the national economy than one’s national government.
3  
                                                 
2 Note that for the purposes of this argument, the distinction between real and perceived 
constraints is not important.  If citizens widely share the belief that their government is unable to 
manage the economy due to international market pressures, they will behave in the same fashion 
regardless of whether their perceptions are actually correct or not.  A same argument applies 
when one substitutes “Brussels” for international market pressures. 
3 Carey (2006) finds that the influence of national economic perceptions on EU support in Great 
Britain is stronger among those who believe the EU has more influence over the British   9
Hypothesis Two: Individuals who attribute responsibility for the economy to the EU are 
less likely to engage in economic voting than those who attribute responsibility to their 
national government. 
Economic Integration and Turnout 
  One important line of recent scholarship on the determinants of turnout has emphasized 
the competitive context of an election.  Individuals are more likely to vote when they believe 
their vote will be decisive.  Accordingly, electoral participation rises when the election result is 
expected to be close (Blais 2000), when elections produce clear outcomes (Jackman 1987), and 
when the policy decisiveness of an election is high (Blais and Dobrzynska 1998, Franklin 2004).  
By contrast, turnout drops in US elections contested under divided government (Franklin and 
Hirczy de Mino 1998), and turnout in the EU is generally lower for “second-order” elections to 
the European Parliament than to national elections (van der Eijk and Franklin 1996).  Thus, a 
central result is that changes that reduce the perceived importance of voting should cause 
declines in electoral participation. 
  Increasing economic integration may reduce the perceived importance of elections.  As 
discussed above, evidence suggests that voters in open economies are less likely to sanction 
governments for economic conditions than (Hellwig 2001, Hellwig and Samuels 2007).  
Building upon this logic allows us to predict that globalization should also reduce voter 
participation.  As national governments lose the (perceived) ability to operate independently in 
economic spheres, elections lose value as mechanisms for selecting or removing competent 
managers of the economy.  A globalized economy is one in which “elections are less meaningful 
                                                                                                                                                             
economy.  This finding provides further evidence that citizens incorporate their understanding of 
multi-level governance into judgments of accountability.   10
as vehicles for achieving or blocking policy change” (Franklin 2004, 179).  If true, the 
implication should be that voter participation is less likely under economic integration, 
particularly among individuals who believe that integration constrains government policy.  In a 
cross-national study, Tillman (2008) finds evidence of a negative relationship between economic 
openness and aggregate voter turnout.   
  In this paper, I examine whether the logic of this argument applies to European 
integration.  Are citizens who perceive high levels of EU influence on the national economy 
economics less likely to vote than those who do not?  I expect to find a relationship between 
electoral participation and perceptions of control of the national economy.  Respondents who 
believe that EU policies have more influence over the state of the national economy than national 
government policies should be more likely to abstain from voting than those who think that the 
national government has the main effect on the national economy.   
Hypothesis Three: Respondents who attribute responsibility for the economy to the EU 
are less likely to vote than those who attribute responsibility to the British government. 
 
Research Design 
  The three hypotheses described in the previous section predict relationships between 
preferences over adoption of the Euro, judgments of the influence of the EU in the British 
economy, economic judgments, and voting behavior—defined to include both participation and 
party choice.  These multiple demands limit the availability of data.  The 2001 British Election   11
Study (Sanders et al 2001) includes appropriate questions on each issue, so it is used in the 
analyses below.
4   
  The dependent variable is the reported voting behavior of the respondent in the post-
election survey.
5 There are three major parties included in the analysis: the incumbent Labour 
Party, the main opposition Conservative Party (Tories), and the traditional “third-party” Liberal 
Democrats (LDP).  In addition, approximately 40% of eligible voters failed to cast a ballot in the 
2001 election.  As is fairly typical, the survey underestimates the number of individuals who did 
not vote; however, this creates a more conservative test of Hypothesis Three.  Additionally, 
supporters of several smaller parties and regional parties are dropped from the analysis, as they 
are too few in number to make estimation feasible.  The dependent variable is structured as 
follows (percentage of respondents choosing each alternative in parentheses): 
 0=Abstain  (33.9%) 
                                                 
4 Ideally, one would analyze multiple elections from multiple countries.  However, I could not 
find other election studies that contained the necessary questions to test all three hypotheses 
proposed in this paper.  
5 I use reported voting behavior rather than party utilities here for several reasons.  The party 
utilities approach has recently been advocated (van der Eijk et al 2006) due to its inclusion of 
information about the voters’ preferences for all parties, much of which is lost when the 
dependent variable records only the party choice of the individual.  Furthermore, party utilities 
correlate highly with reported vote choice.  However, the party utilities approach is not feasible 
for this study because it provides no intuitive way of incorporating voter abstention into the 
dependent variable, and the transformations necessary for individual-specific independent 
variables rule out the use of interaction terms with those variables.     12
 1=Conservative  (18.6%) 
 2=Labour  (34.5%) 
  3=Liberal Democrat (13.1%) 
 Several  independent  variables are included.  Euro Distance measures the distance 
between the respondent and the mean of each party on an 11-point scale asking whether the UK 
should adopt the Euro as its currency or not.  A score of 0 indicates “definitely replace” the 
Pound with the Euro and 10 indicates “definitely keep” the Pound instead of the Euro.  
Respondents are asked to indicate their own position on this scale as well as their perception of 
each party’s position: I take the absolute distance of each respondent’s position from the mean 
value of each party’s position to create the variable.  Hypothesis One leads us to expect a 
negative relationship between this variable and one’s vote choice: as the distance between the 
respondent and a party increases (indicating less agreement on the Euro question), the likelihood 
of the respondent voting for that party decreases. 
  Hypotheses Two and Three predict that perceptions about the relative influence of the EU 
and the British government on the British economy affect voting behavior.  To measure these 
perceptions, I use the responses to a question asking, “Which one of the following do you think 
affects the general economic situation in [the United Kingdom] the most?  Would you say the 
British government or the European Union?” Respondents had the option of indicating either of 
those two choices, or spontaneous responses that both had an equal effect or neither had an effect 
were also recorded.  Using these responses, I generate a dummy variable called EU Influence 
that is coded 1 if the respondent chose the EU, and 0 otherwise (the British government, both 
equally, or neither).  Hypothesis Three predicts that this variable should have a direct and 
positive effect on the likelihood of a respondent not voting.   13
  I measure economic judgments using a standard retrospective sociotropic questions.  
Economy is coded using a question asking respondents to evaluate how the “general economic 
situation” in the UK has changed over the past twelve months.  Responses indicating that it had 
worsened are coded as -1, those indicating that it was unchanged are coded as 0, and those 
indicating that it had improved are coded as 1.  In order to test Hypothesis Two, I create 
interaction terms between this measure of economic evaluations and EU Influence.  I expect that 
Economy will be negative and significant for the Conservatives, Liberal Democrats, and 
abstention relative to the Labour Party (indicating that negative judgments reduce the likelihood 
of voting Labour in favor of the other three alternatives).  However, the interaction term should 
be positive, indicating that respondents who believe that the EU has more influence on the state 
of the economy than the British government are significantly less likely to base their vote on 
their judgment of the economy than those who do not.   
  I include two other policy distance scales to control for other factors influencing the vote.  
Ideology is based on the answers to a question asking respondents to place themselves and each 
party on a standard 11-point left-right ideological scale.  I expect that this variable to have the 
most powerful effect on voting behavior.  Crime is based on respondents’ placement of 
themselves and parties on a scale where 0 indicates that “reducing crime is more important” and 
10 indicates that “protecting the rights of the accused” is more important.  Each of these two 
policy distance variables is constructed in identical fashion to EU Distance, meaning that each 
measures the unique distance for each party-respondent combination.  In general, all three 
variables should be negative and significant.   
  I include a series of additional variables in the analysis to control for other potential 
influences on voting behavior.  Income measures the respondent’s self-reported household   14
income on a twelve-point scale.  Class is a dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent self-
identifies as a member of the working class and 0 otherwise.  Gender is coded 1 if the respondent 
is male, 0 if female.  Political Interest is measured on a five-point scale where 5 indicates “a 
great deal” of interest in politics and 1 indicates that the respondent is “not at all” interested in 
politics.  Democracy is coded 1 if the respondent indicates being very or fairly satisfied with “the 
way democracy works” in the UK, and 0 otherwise.  Respondents living in an owner-occupied 
home are coded 1 in Homeowner, and respondents who do not are coded 0.  Union is coded 1 for 
those respondents who indicate being members of union households, 0 otherwise.  Age measures 
the respondent’s age bracket on a five-point scale.  EU Member is based on the standard question 
asking respondents’ approval of British membership in the EU.  Responses indicating that 
membership is a bad thing are coded 1, those that say it is neither good nor bad are coded 2, and 
those indicating that it is a good thing are coded 3.  
 
Analyses and Results 
  To test the hypotheses described above, the statistical analysis must allow for the 
inclusion of choice-specific variables, such as the policy distance variables, in which there is a 
different possible value for each combination of respondent and party (the choice in this 
analysis).  In addition, it must incorporate interaction terms between individual-specific 
variables.
6  For these reasons, the conditional logit estimator is preferred.  In addition, the 
                                                 
6 The need to include these interaction terms between individual-specific variables rules out the 
use of the party utilities approach (van der Eijk et al 2006).  The party utilities technique requires 
that individual-specific variables be transformed prior to analysis, making analysis of any 
interactions between them substantively meaningless.   15
conditional logit estimator does not suffer from the potentially serious (and hard to diagnose) 
problem of fragile identification as does the multinomial probit model.   
Typically, conditional logit models have been used to analyze the determinants of party 
choice in studies of voting behavior (e.g., de Vries, 2007, Hellwig 2008, Tillman 2004) and have 
not included abstention as a possible alternative in the dependent variable.  Incorporating non-
voters poses an analytical challenge, as abstention does not have a meaningful policy position as 
do parties.  However, it is necessary to set a policy position for abstention to estimate the 
model—creating the potential for biased coefficients on the policy distance variables.  To 
alleviate these problems, the policy positions for abstention are arbitrarily set to the sample of 
respondents’ self-placements, creating a (substantively meaningless) distance between 
respondent and abstention.  I then create an interaction term between the marker variable 
indicating abstention and the policy distance variable (e.g., Euro Distance X abstention), which 
isolates the effect of the policy distance on the likelihood of not voting.  In turn, this means that 
the coefficients for the policy distance variables show their effects only upon the likelihood of 
voting for one of the three parties (in other words, when abstention is not the choice under 
consideration).
7  
Table 1 reports the results of the conditional logit model.  Note that the variables 
contained in the analysis are a mix of choice-specific variables (the policy distance variables) 
and respondent-specific variables (all other variables).  There is a single coefficient for each 
                                                 
7 These interaction terms between abstention and the policy distance variables are substantively 
meaningless.  However, the fact that each is positive is to be expected: the (meaningless) 
relationship between the policy distance and the likelihood of abstention is weaker than it is for 
the substantively meaningful party alternatives.     16
choice-specific variable (Euro, Ideology, and Crime), which can be understood as an 
unconditional effect for all respondent-party combinations.  The respondent-specific variables 
have a unique coefficient for each respondent-party combination, which shows the effect of that 
variable upon the likelihood that the respondent will choose the option indicated in the header 
over the baseline option (the Labour Party). 
[Table 1 about here] 
  The results provide mixed support for the three hypotheses.  Hypothesis One predicts that 
preferences over the Euro influence voting behavior.  Consistent with expectations, Euro is 
negative and significant.  This coefficient indicates that respondents become less likely to vote 
for a party as its position on adopting the Euro becomes more distant from their own.  Notably, 
this finding holds even with the inclusion of two domestic policy distance variables.  Ideology is 
negative and significant, as expected.  However, Crime is not significant, suggesting that 
preferences over participation in the Euro had a larger effect than preferences over policies 
related to law and order in this election.  In short, the evidence is consistent with Hypothesis One 
and suggests that preferences over the Euro had a significant effect on party support.  This 
finding is consistent with the EU issue voting hypothesis and adds to the work demonstrating 
that European issues influence voting behavior in national elections (Gabel 2000, Tillman 2004, 
de Vries 2007, Schoen 2008). 
  Hypothesis Two predicts that economic voting is weaker for respondents who attribute 
more responsibility to the EU for the state of the national economy.  This hypothesis requires 
care in testing, as it requires the use of an interaction term between Economy and EU Influence.  
The coefficients for Economy show the effect of past economic judgments on each party 
combination only when EU Distance =0.  These coefficients are negative and significant,   17
showing that positive perceptions of the economy increase the likelihood of voting Labour 
(versus any of the other three choices) among those who attributed responsibility to the British 
government.  The interaction terms are not significant, but two of the three (for the 
Conservatives and Abstention) are positive.   
At first glance, this might indicate that Hypothesis Two should be rejected, but it is 
necessary when using interaction terms to conduct post-estimation analyses (Brambor et al 
2006).  To test Hypothesis two properly, I simulate the voting behavior of four hypothetical 
respondents.  Using the spost package available as an add-on to Stata 9 (Long & Freese 2006), I 
estimate the predicted probability for each party under different conditions.
8  Figure 1 presents 
the predicted change in the likelihood of voting for the incumbent Labour Party for a 
hypothetical partisan of each party and a non-partisan as the respondent’s judgment of the 
economy is shifted from “worse” to “better” while all other variables are set to sample median 
values.  This simulation is repeated while setting the respondent’s belief that the British 
government is primarily responsible for the state of the economy (EU Influence = 0) and then 
when the respondent believes the EU has a greater effect on the state of the national economy 
(EU Influence = 1).   
[Figure 1 about here] 
                                                 
8 Due to complications with simulating probabilities using interaction terms in the conditional 
logit model, I first estimate a multinomial logit model (not shown) that does not include the 
policy distance variables in order to conduct the simulation.  The coefficients for Economy, EU 
Influence, and the interaction between the two are substantively identical to those obtained from 
the conditional logit model presented in Table 1.   18
  An examination of Figure 1 shows that the evidence does not support Hypothesis Two.  
For each hypothetical voter, the darker bar shows the change in voting Labour when 
responsibility is attributed to the British government, and the lighter bar shows the predicted 
change when responsibility is attributed to the EU.  For the evidence to support Hypothesis Two, 
the darker bars would need to be consistently larger than the lighter bars.  This occurs only for 
the hypothetical Conservative Party identifier.  The effects are virtually identical for the Labour 
partisan and non-partisan, and the results are in the opposite direction for the Liberal Democrat.  
In short, the evidence leads to a rejection of Hypothesis Two.  
  Hypothesis Three suggests that abstention is more likely among those who attribute 
greater responsibility for the economy to the EU.  The evidence presented in Table 1 provides 
some support for this hypothesis.   EU Influence is positive and significant for the 
Labour/Abstain combination.  In other words, individuals who attribute greater economic 
responsibility to the EU are more likely to abstain than to vote Labour.  However, the effect is 
not significant for the decision of whether to vote for other parties or to abstain (the effect is 
negative but does not attain statistical significance for the other combinations).  This finding 
suggests that individuals who attributed the state of the economy to the EU were more likely not 
to vote at the expense of the governing Labour Party.   
  To further examine Hypothesis Three, I estimate a logit model of electoral participation.  
This test allows one to examine whether the evidence in support of Hypothesis Three holds when 
no assumptions about policy distances are imposed.  It is not possible to include the policy 
distance variables in a logistic regression, thus eliminating a test of the first and second 
hypotheses.  However, it is possible to test Hypothesis Three directly.  In this model, the 
dependent variable is coded 1 if the respondent reported voting (for any party) and 0 otherwise.    19
Other independent variables remain unchanged, with the exception that the respondent’s 
ideology is now coded using two dummy variables.  Left indicates those respondents placing 
themselves at a score of 3 or lower, and Right takes a value of 1 for those who placed themselves 
at a score of 7 or higher.  The omitted reference category includes those respondents who self-
placed between 4 and 6.  The results of this analysis are presented in Table 2.  EU Influence is 
negative and significant, indicating that perceptions of greater EU influence on that national 
economy reduce the likelihood of voting across all respondents.  This effect holds even with the 
inclusion of various control variables that explain the decision to vote.
9 Subsequent post-
estimation simulations estimate that a change in EU Influence reduces the probability of voting 
by about 5 percentage points (this predicted change is significant at the .05 level).  Thus, it is fair 
to say the effect is modest but not trivial.  In sum, the evidence supports Hypothesis One and 
Hypothesis Three, but it provides little support for Hypothesis Two.   
                                                 
9 One potential objection is that the responses to the EU Influence question are endogenous to 
partisanship and support for EU membership.  In order to address this possibility, I estimate a 
logistic regression in which EU Influence is the dependent variable, and independent variables 
include partisanship, EU Support, and other measures of political attitudes and demographics.  
Not surprisingly, Conservative Party and LDP identifiers are more likely to attribute 
responsibility for the economy to the EU, while Labour Party supporters are less likely to.  Also, 
support for EU membership has a negative effect.  A number of other control variables are 
significant; however, the overall fit of the model is weak (pseudo R
2 = 0.05), suggesting that EU 
Influence is largely exogenous to these variables.  It is important to note that the models 
presented in Tables 1 and 2 include controls for partisanship and EU support, so the results are 
not likely to be driven by these variables.   20
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Discussion 
  This paper has proposed and tested three hypotheses about the effects of European 
integration on voting behavior in the 2001 British general election.  The results of the analysis 
support several empirical conclusions.  First, the evidence is consistent with the EU issue voting 
hypothesis, as the results show that respondents were more likely to vote for a party that held a 
position closer to their own on the question of British adoption of the common currency.  This 
result adds support to the EU issue voting hypothesis (Tillman 2004, de Vries 2007).  More 
importantly, this paper expands the study of EU issue voting beyond a general pro/anti-EU 
dimension to consider the effects of attitudes towards a specific European policy issue (the 
common currency) on voting behavior (see also Schoen 2008).  This finding adds to our 
confidence that European issues have become important in national elections and replicates 
previous findings about the role of European issues on party support and voting behavior in 
Great Britain (de Vries 2007, Evans 1998).  
The second finding to emerge is that individuals who believe the EU has more influence 
over the British economy than the British government were less likely to vote in this election.  
The lack of similar questions on other surveys prevents any efforts to replicate this result in other 
elections at this point.  Still, this result adds weight to the growing body of evidence suggesting 
that economic integration is weakening traditional forms of democratic accountability, reducing 
the potential salience of national elections with regards to economic policy (Tillman 2008).  In 
addition, this finding, in combination with the EU issue voting result described above, generates 
an interesting picture for the development of national elections within the EU.  With growing 
awareness of the impact of the EU on domestic circumstances, there appears to be increased   21
contestation and voting on European issues.  However, it may also be that some voters are 
responding to this shift by withdrawing from politics.  This conjecture seems plausible when one 
considers the concerns over the democratic deficit within the EU.  Unfortunately, this survey 
does not include questions about perceptions of democracy within the EU, so this conjecture 
cannot be examined here.  Scholars should examine this possibility in future work. 
Interestingly, the second hypothesis did not find support.  The analysis did not indicate 
consistently weaker levels of economic voting among those who attributed more economic 
responsibility to the EU than to the British government, contrary to the results of other cross-
national studies (Hellwig 2001, Hellwig and Samuels 2007).  There was a significant difference 
in the expected direction among Conservative Party identifiers, but this trend was not apparent 
for other partisans (and it was reversed among Liberal Democrat partisans). 
  There are limitations to this paper’s analyses.  The first is that this paper takes hypotheses 
derived from the study of globalization and applies them to the EU, which may be inappropriate 
due to the fact that European integration is different than globalization.  In many respects, this is 
true.  However, the effects of European integration on domestic electoral accountability should 
be similar to those attributed to globalization.  Even for countries such as the UK that have not 
adopted the Euro, EU law constraints domestic governments on a wide range of economic and 
social policies.  Thus, governments within the EU face serious constraints on their policy making 
ability, and recent evidence suggests that voters are aware of these constraints (in some cases, 
perhaps overestimating their extent).     
A second potential objection concerns the focus on the 2001 British election.  Of course, 
this is a fair objection in that a study of a single election always leaves open the chance that 
various factors unique to this election have biased the results.  The UK in 2001 was notable in   22
that there was clear disagreement between the major parties on whether to adopt the Euro.  This 
marks a clear distinction between the politics of European integration in many member states (at 
least in Western Europe), where the major parties often take moderately pro-EU positions and 
are reluctant to campaign aggressively on the issue (Marks et al 2006).  In addition, the UK is 
unlike many EU member states in that its political system facilitates strong single-party 
governments.  These factors combined make the 2001 British election a favorable case for 
finding evidence of EU issue voting (Edwards & de Vries 2008).  Thus, it is clear that this 
election provides a favorable case for finding evidence of these hypotheses, but there is little 
reason aside to think that it would produce misleading results.  In any case, the lack of 
appropriate data from other election studies means that this concern will stand until future data 
become available.  
  Future research should also consider the role of political elites in conditioning the effects 
of economic integration on electoral behavior.  Evidence suggests that competition between 
parties on the EU issue is necessary for EU issue voting to occur (de Vries 2007).  However, 
mainstream parties in Western Europe also tend to be reluctant to adopt strong positions on the 
EU, as many face internal divisions on the issue (Edwards 2007).  Elites may also choose to 
emphasize other, non-economic, issues for electoral gain (Hellwig 2008).  It is likely that the 
degree of electoral responses seen in different cases (i.e., greater EU issue voting, increased 
abstention) will depend on how party leaders choose to approach integration-related issues.  
When rival parties take clear and divergent stands on integration, more issue voting should 
occur, and the importance of the issue may increase turnout by adding to the perceived salience 
of the election.  When parties collectively avoid the integration issue, less EU issue voting and 
more abstention should be likely.  Thus, we should begin to observe greater cross-national   23
variations in patterns of participation and issue voting as political elites diverge in their responses 
to economic integration.   24
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Table 1. Conditional Logit Estimates of Voting Behavior in the 2001 British Election 
 
  Conservative vs. 
Labour 
LDP vs. Labour  Abstain vs. Labour 
Euro  -.213*  
(.038) 
Ideology  -.415*  
(.084) 
Crime  .011  
(.072) 
EU Influence  .187  
(.294) 
.148  
(.258) 
.490*  
(.215) 
Economy  -.770*  
(.208) 
-.277 
(.167) 
-.445* 
(.145) 
EU Influence 
X Economy 
.259 
(.367) 
-.479 
(.327) 
.041 
(.269) 
Income  .060 
(.046) 
.048 
(.038) 
.051 
(.033) 
Class  -.588 
(.325) 
-.509* 
(.250) 
-.140 
(.199) 
Gender  .104 
(.267) 
-.262 
(.218) 
.426* 
(.190) 
Democracy 
Satisfaction 
-.722* 
(.272) 
-.387 
(.225) 
-.475* 
(.197) 
Homeowner  1.18* 
(.374) 
.366 
(.283) 
-.094 
(.228) 
Political 
Interest 
-.094 
(.126) 
.016 
(.106) 
-.086 
(.091) 
Union  -.535 
(.330) 
-.289 
(251) 
-.451* 
(.218) 
Age  -.063 
(.094) 
-.027 
(.077) 
-.298* 
(.070) 
Labour ID  -3.93* 
(.740) 
-2.40* 
(.265) 
-1.37* 
(.203) 
Tory ID  3.04* 
(.453) 
.626 
(.497) 
1.38* 
(.452) 
LDP ID  -.576 
(1.15) 
2.73* 
(.543) 
.813 
(.621) 
EU Support  -.326* 
(.151) 
.035 
(.127) 
.197 
(.109) 
EU Influence 
X Euro 
.165* 
(.052) 
EU Influence 
X Ideology 
.075 
(.060) 
EU Influence 
X Crime 
.054 
(.048)   29
N  1160 
Log-likelihood  -975.4013 
Pseudo R
2  0.38 
 
Note: Labour is the omitted category for the individual-specific variables.  Cell entries show the 
conditional logit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
 
* p<.05, two-tailed test  30
Table 2. Logit Estimates of Voter Participation in the 2001 British General Election 
 
  Coefficient Standard  Error 
EU Influence  -.214* .065 
Labour ID  .590* .071 
Tory ID  700* .092 
LDP ID  1.36* .154 
Left Ideology  .035 .082 
Right Ideology  .222* .823 
Economy  .133* .039 
Income  .028* .011 
Class  -.130 .068 
Gender  -.443* .060 
Democracy Satisfaction  .271* .064 
Homeowner  .641* .072 
Political Interest  .382* .031 
Union  .313* .074 
Age  .368* .023 
EU Support  .093* .037 
Constant  -2.37* .140 
 
N 
 
1759 
Log-likelihood  -3584.04 
Pseudo R
2  0.144 
 
* p<.05, two-tailed 
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Figure 1. Magnitude of the Economic Vote by Partisanship 
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